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Abstract 
We examine how third-party debt enforcement affects the emergence and performance of 
relational contracts in credit markets. We implement an experiment with finitely repeated 
credit relationships in which borrowers can default. In our weak enforcement treatment 
defaulting borrowers can keep their funds invested. In our strong enforcement treatment 
defaulting borrowers have to liquidate their investment. Under weak enforcement fewer 
relationships emerge in which loans are extended and repaid. When such relationships do 
emerge they exhibit a lower credit volume than under strong enforcement. These findings 
suggest that relational contracting in credit markets requires a minimum standard of third-
party debt enforcement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Creditor rights and debt enforcement are important determinants of credit market 
performance. Following La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), recent cross-country studies have 
documented that better protection of creditor rights (Djankov et al., 2007), more efficient 
contract enforcement (Djankov et al., 2003) and debt enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008) are 
strongly related to aggregate financial development.  
The empirical relation between law and finance is puzzling in view of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on relational contracting. Relational contracts, i.e. implicit self-enforcing 
agreements can overcome moral hazard in the lender-borrower relationship as shown 
theoretically in Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) or Boot and Thakor (1994) and empirically by 
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Brown and Zehnder (2007). Given that relational 
contracts can substitute third-party enforcement, why do we still observe a strong relationship 
between creditor protection and financial development?  
This paper reconciles the contradictory existing evidence from the law and finance and 
relational contracting literatures. We provide experimental evidence showing that in credit 
and investment contexts a minimum standard of third-party debt enforcement is necessary for 
relational contracts to emerge in the first place. The intuition behind our finding is that weak 
debt enforcement, e.g. slow and inefficient bankruptcy procedures, may allow borrowers to 
keep and reinvest funds after default and thereby seriously weaken their dynamic incentives to 
repay. Examples of weak enforcement include allowing an automatic stay on assets or having 
very lengthy judicial procedures to enforce contracts.1 Evidence from the 2010 Doing 
Business Indicators of the World Bank2 shows that the time required by a lender to recover a 
secured debt through a bankruptcy procedure ranges from 1.7 years on average in OECD 
countries to 3.4 years in Sub-Saharan Africa and 4.5 years in South Asia. The recovery rate 
                                                 
1 In addition, borrowers may “tunnel” loaned funds to other investments (Johnson et al., 2000).  
2 The data is available under www.doingbusiness.org 
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(cents on the dollar) for the lender may also be very low, varying hereby from 68.6 in OECD 
countries to 17 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 20 in South Asia.3  
We implement a credit market experiment in which a lender and a borrower interact for 7 
periods. In each period the principal decides how much to lend to the borrower and what 
interest payment to request. If the borrower receives a loan, he earns a deterministic 
investment return. The borrower then decides whether to make the repayment requested by 
the lender. In our main treatment, a borrower who defaults can use the borrowed funds to 
invest in future periods. We compare this main treatment to an otherwise identical control 
treatment in which, upon default, the borrower cannot use the borrowed funds for future 
investment. In both treatments strategic default is thus possible. What affects credit market 
performance is the strength of debt enforcement after default. 
We expect weak debt enforcement to have two main effects on lender-borrower 
relationships in our experiment: First, we expect to see less relational contracts in which 
borrowers are motivated to repay loans and more credit relationships in which borrowers 
default, and thus are screened out, in initial periods. Second, when relational contracts emerge 
under weak debt enforcement, we expect them to display lower credit volumes in initial 
periods. Only by "starting small" and increasing loan sizes over time can a lender motivate a 
borrower to repay when debt enforcement is weak.  
Our experimental results confirm these predictions: Aggregate lending is lower when 
enforcement is weak compared to when it is strong, leading to lower investment and 
efficiency. In particular, loans offered in the initial period of a relationship are substantially 
lower under weak enforcement. When borrowers can use the lender’s funds after default, they 
default more often in early periods of a relationship, especially when they receive a large loan.  
                                                 
3 Looking at a broader set of regulations and institutions which protect creditors, the Legal Rights Index elicited 
by Doing Business (on a scale of 0-10) varies from 6.8 in OECD countries to 4.6 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.3 
in South Asia. Even if one accounts for the variation in the Legal Rights Index, debt enforcement continues to be 
strongly related to credit market performance (Djankov et al., 2008).   
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Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on law and finance by identifying a causal 
impact of debt enforcement on implicit contracting and credit market performance. Recent 
evidence for example from China (Allen et al., 2005) has cast doubt on the relationship 
between the legal environment and financial sector development, citing relational contracting 
as a substitute enforcement mechanism. Our results show by contrast that a minimum 
standard of third-party debt enforcement is necessary for relational credit contracts to be 
effective. Our experimental results also complement the findings of Qian and Strahan (2007) 
showing that the quality of creditor protection affects loan characteristics. Using data on 
corporate lending to firms in 49 countries they show that loan maturities are shorter in 
countries with weaker creditor protection. They argue that weak protection induces banks to 
shorten loan maturities in order to incentivize borrowers. Our results show that weak creditor 
protection also affects the schedule of loan sizes provided by the bank over time in a credit 
relationship.  
Our paper also contributes to the extensive literature on relational contracting in labor (e.g. 
Bull, 1987, MacLeod and Malcolmson, 1998) and credit relationships (e.g. Boot and Thakor, 
1994, Boot, 2000). Experimental evidence both in labor and credit environments has shown 
that relationships can be sustained and lead to more efficient outcomes than one-shot 
interactions (see e.g. Brown et al., 2004; Fehr and Zehnder, 2009).4 The existing experimental 
literature has explored two conditions under which relational contracts may not be a good 
substitute for third-party creditor protection: lender competition and non-deterministic 
investment returns. Competition between lenders could potentially weaken borrowers’ 
incentives to repay and thus explain why enforcement is still important. However, Brown and 
Zehnder (2007) show that, even in the presence of competition, relational contracts emerge 
and lead to large volumes of credit. Similarly, stochastic investment returns may limit the 
                                                 
4 See Fehr et al. (2009) for an overview of the experimental evidence on relational contracting.  
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scope for relational contracts as lenders cannot perfectly identify and punish strategic defaults. 
However, Fehr and Zehnder (2009) find that even with stochastic investment returns 
relational contracts emerge and sustain high credit volumes. To our knowledge, existing 
experimental investigations of relational contracting ignore the fact that weak enforcement 
may allow agents to reinvest the lender’s funds.5 
We further contribute to the theoretical and empirical literature studying the increase in 
stakes over time in credit and investment relationships. Weak enforcement provides a 
rationale for the observation of the gradual building up of credit relationships in microfinance 
(Morduch, 1999, Armendariz and Morduch, 2006), in small-business lending (Ioannidou and 
Ongena, 2010), and in FDI relationships (Rauch and Watson, 2003). Several reasons have 
been suggested for the progressive increase in stakes within principal-agent games. Some are 
based on the existence of asymmetric information about players' types, i.e. whether they are 
myopic or patient (Ghosh and Ray, 1996 and 2001), high or low ability (Rauch and Watson, 
2003) or have a preference for cooperation or not (Sobel, 1985)6. Others are based on the 
optimality for the principal to increase stakes towards the end of the relationship, such that he 
can extract a greater surplus in the beginning (e.g. Thomas and Worrall, 1994, and Ray, 
2002), or on the fact that borrowing constraints may be endogenous to the dynamics of debt 
and thus make increasing loan sizes optimal (Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004).  
Finally, our experimental results provide support to the hypothesis that sovereign lending 
is adversely affected by the lack of legal recourse (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Our findings 
suggest that in a lending environment where the borrower can continue to invest the lender’s 
funds after default, as is the case in sovereign lending, borrowers will face credit constraints. 
                                                 
5 Falk et al. (2008) show that dismissal barriers can prevent relational contracting in labor markets. Thus similar 
to our paper they examine how institutional changes affect the emergence of implicit agreements.  In contrast to 
their paper, we examine institutional features inherent to the credit market (debt enforcement) and not only 
examine whether these institutions affect the emergence of implicit agreements, but also how these agreements 
are structured over time.  
6 This has also been studied in prisoner's dilemmas (see Watson, 1999 and 2002, Andreoni and Samuelson, 
2006). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design. 
In Section 3, we outline the predictions. We report the experimental results in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Experimental design 
2.1. Weak enforcement treatment  
In a single round of our main treatment, the Weak Enforcement treatment (WE 
treatment), one lender and one borrower are paired for 7 periods. We choose a finite horizon 
game because it allows us to identify the emergence of reputation based implicit agreements. 
While reputation concerns are constant in an infinite horizon, they are strong at the beginning 
and very weak at the end with a finite horizon. As shown, for example, by Brown and 
Zehnder (2007) relational credit contracts can thus be identified as relationships in which the 
borrower repays in non-final periods and then defaults in the final period. We choose 7 
periods rather than 2 or 3, to be able to clearly separate the initial ‘starting small’ in loan sizes 
from the potential end-game effect, i.e. a reduction of loan sizes in the last periods of the 
game due to the fact that the game is close to an end.  
In each period t = {1,..,7} the borrower has an investment opportunity: he can invest the 
amount It∈  {0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 10}, which yields a gross return of 3It. with certainty.7 We hold the 
investment opportunity of the borrower constant over time in order to examine credit 
rationing over the course of a relationship.8 
                                                 
7 For an experimental analysis of credit relationships with stochastic investment returns see Fehr and Zehnder 
(2009). 
8 If, for example, we observe that a lenders offers a small loan in period 1 and she increases it over time, we 
know that the borrower was credit constrained in period 1. By contrast, when field studies observe rising loan 
schedules over time (e.g. Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010) they typically cannot distinguish whether this is due to 
increasing investment opportunities of the borrower over time or a relaxation of credit constraints. Kirschenmann 
(2010) examines credit constraints over the course of microfinance relationships by contrasting the desired loan 
size and granted loan size as reported in credit file data of a Bulgarian bank. However, her identification of credit 
constraints is based on the assumption that borrowers report their true financing needs.  
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The investment amount of the borrower in each period It = Ct + St is equal to his capital Ct 
and the loan size St he receives from the lender. In period 1 the borrower starts off with zero 
capital C1=0. The loan available to the borrower in each period t={1,..,7} and the capital of 
the borrower in periods t={2,..,7} are determined by the subsequent decisions of the lender 
and borrower. The decision structure in each period is as follows: 
• Loan offer: The lender receives an endowment of 10 units at the beginning of each 
period. As the borrower can invest at most 10 units per period, the lender can offer a 
loan size of St ∈  [0, 10-Ct] to the borrower. The lender also chooses her requested 
repayment Rt. The requested repayment cannot exceed the income generated by the 
loan: Rt ∈  [0, 3St]. When the lender has determined her offer (St, Rt), the offer is shown 
to the borrower. 
• Loan acceptance: If the lender chooses an offer with a strictly positive loan St >0, the 
borrower must decide whether to accept (At=1) or reject the offer (At=0). 
• Repayment decision: If the borrower accepts a loan offer (St, Rt), he then decides 
whether to make the repayment requested by the lender (Dt=0) or default (Dt=1). 
Partial repayments are not possible.9 
 
As mentioned above, the borrower starts off with zero capital. However, if the borrower 
receives a loan, he can keep the lender’s funds for future investment. We assume that 
borrowers who default in period t automatically have the loan principal St added to their 
capital for all subsequent periods. We further assume that borrowers cannot liquidate their 
capital (and consume the proceeds) before the final period.10 The capital of a borrower in 
                                                 
9 In reality some borrowers obviously become delinquent without fully defaulting. However, due to the 
deterministic nature of investment earnings in our design we exclude partial repayments, as in Brown and 
Zehnder (2007). 
10 The fact that we force borrowers to reinvest funds that they keep after default, rather than allowing them to 
decide whether to consume or reinvest them, seems restrictive. We made this design choice for two reasons. 
First, we wanted to simplify the game as much as possible by abstracting from consumption / saving decisions. 
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periods t={2,…,7} thus equals the sum of the loaned funds which he did not repay: 
∑
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Both the lender and the borrower receive a symmetric “reservation” income of 10 points 
per period. This design choice was made so that asymmetric reservation payoffs would not 
affect the decisions of lenders to offer credit. Thus, the income of the lender in each period is 
equal to her reservation payoff plus her net income from lending (Rt - St) if she lends.  
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The income of the borrower is equal to his reservation payoff plus his gross investment 
income 3(Ct + St) minus any repayment he makes to the lender (Rt ) and minus the capital 
which he keeps for the following period Ct+1 = Ct + DtSt. As mentioned above, borrowers 
cannot liquidate their capital before the final period. In periods t={1,…,6} this amount is thus 
deducted from their gross income and transferred as capital to the following period. 
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We assume that at the end of period 7 the borrower can liquidate all of his capital and 
consume it. We make this assumption to ensure that repayment behavior in the final period of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Second, reinvestment of loaned funds is the optimal strategy of a borrower who has defaulted: in a reputation 
equilibrium, any borrower who defaults on a loan will not receive future loans and so it is in his best interest to 
reinvest the funds he has available. 
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our main treatment has the same payoff implications as in our control treatment (described 
below) where loan defaults are feasible but the reinvestment of loan principal is not.  
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At the end of each period the lender is informed about the borrower's repayment decision. 
Each player gets to know his own and his partner's payoffs for this period and both players are 
informed about the borrower's capital for the following period. 
 
2.2. Strong Enforcement Treatment 
We contrast our main treatment with a control treatment in which the borrower must 
liquidate the lender’s funds after default, the Strong Enforcement treatment (SE 
treatment). In this treatment the decision structure, information conditions and parameters 
are identical to the WE treatment. The only difference between the two treatments is the 
determination of the borrower's capital. In the SE treatment we impose that the defaulting 
borrower cannot keep the lender’s funds and reinvest them. Thus, Ct =0 in each period. 
Note that in both the WE treatment and the SE treatment borrowers can default on their 
loans. The difference between the two treatments lies in what a borrower can do with the 
funds when he defaults. In the SE treatment the borrower must liquidate all of these funds and 
cannot reinvest any part of them. This treatment represents a legal environment in which loan 
default is possible, but enforcement occurs relatively quickly, such that the borrower can only 
evade repaying a loan if he liquidates his investment and consumes all the proceeds by the 
end of the period. In the WE treatment, by contrast, the borrower is not forced to liquidate his 
investment in the same period, if he defaults on a loan. The borrower continues using the 
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loaned funds for investment purposes without having to surrender either his assets or his 
future profits from these assets to the creditor, due to the slow pace of debt enforcement. The 
WE treatment thus represents a legal environment in which creditor protection and debt 
enforcement are weaker than in the SE treatment.  
Our lending game is closely related to the trust or investment game introduced by Berg et 
al. (1995). Repeated investment games have been studied intensively in the experimental 
literature (for a review see, e.g., Camerer 2003). They have also been adapted to lending 
relationships, for the study of experimental credit markets (Brown and Zehnder, 2007). We 
contribute to this literature by exploring the outcome of a repeated investment game which 
accounts for an inherent characteristic of many credit and investment environments: In our 
WE treatment defaulting investees do not rely on repeated interaction with the investor to 
generate future income. Table 1 provides an overview of our experimental treatments. 
 
Treatment  Conditions Matching groups 
   & relations 
Weak Enforcement  7 period game, 7 matching groups = 
(WE Treatment)  borrower can reinvest loan principal 63 lender‐borrower relations
   after default   
Strong Enforcement 7 period game, 8 matching groups = 
(SE Treatment)  borrower cannot reinvest loan principal 72 lender‐borrower relations
   after default   
 
Table 1. Treatments and subjects 
 
 
 
2.3. Procedures 
At the beginning of each session participants are randomly assigned to the role of either a 
borrower or a lender. These roles are fixed for the whole session. Each player forms part of a 
matching group, composed of 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. Each player plays three rounds of 
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our lending game: each lender (borrower) repeats the lending game with three different 
borrowers (lenders) in her/his matching group. As a consequence we observe 9 lender-
borrower relationships for each matching group. 
In the WE and SE treatments, the lender and the borrower have an overview of the history 
of play in previous periods for the current round. As mentioned above, each round lasts 7 
periods. For each past period in the current round they can see the loan size and requested 
repayment of the lender, whether it was accepted by the borrower and whether the borrower 
repaid. As a new round starts, lenders and borrowers are newly matched, and the history of 
play is erased. 
In total 126 students participated in our experiment. In the WE treatment there were 7 
matching groups of 6 players each and in the SE treatment 8 matching groups. As displayed 
by Table 1 this implies that we observe 63 lender-borrower relationships in the WE treatment 
and 72 relationships in the SE treatment. 
Each participant could only participate in one session, so that each subject experienced 
only one of the treatments. All participants were students at Tilburg University. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
Behavior in our lending game might be affected by individual characteristics. First, as 
shown by Schaechter (2007), individual risk preferences affect decisions in trust-games. 
Second, the level of strategic reasoning, i.e. the anticipation of what other subjects in the 
matching group might do, can affect behavior significantly (Nagel, 1995). Third, social 
preferences, i.e. reciprocal motives and fairness preferences of the borrower, as well as the 
anticipation of these preferences, i.e. trust by the lender, should affect behavior in our 
experiment (see Camerer, 2003 for a detailed discussion).11 Before the lending game started, 
                                                 
11 Roe and Wu (2009) show that the behavior of players in a repeated gift-exchange game is related to their 
behavior in one-shot social preference games. 
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the participants took part in three short pre-experiment games aimed at measuring their levels 
of risk aversion, strategic reasoning, trust and trustworthiness. Appendix A describes these 
pre-experiment games in detail and provides summary statistics for their outcomes in the WE 
and SE treatments. We show there that there are no significant differences in behavior in these 
games between the two treatments. The instructions for these games are available from the 
authors upon request.  
Throughout the pre-experimental games subjects received no feedback. They were not 
informed about other subjects' decisions or their own payoffs until the end of the experiment. 
Subjects were informed about this at the beginning of the experiment. They also knew that the 
decisions in each pre-experimental game had no effect on the lending game. 
After the three pre-experimental games and before starting our lending experiment, each 
subject had to read a detailed set of instructions. The instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
The experimental instructions were framed in a credit market language.12 After reading the 
instructions participants had to pass a test with control questions. The lending game did not 
start until all subjects had correctly answered all control questions. 
Sessions in which the SE or WE treatment was played lasted approximately 120 minutes. 
Subjects received a show-up fee of 5 Euros and 1 additional Euro for every 25 points earned 
during the experiment. On average subjects earned 10 euro per 60 minutes of participation. 
 
 
3. Predictions 
Under the assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selfishness of all market 
participants, the predictions for each of our two treatments are straightforward. Since 
                                                 
12 The reason why we chose a context-specific and not a neutral framing was that the experiment was relatively 
complex. In complex experiments a completely neutral language bears the danger that subjects create their own 
(potentially misleading) interpretation of the decision environment. Thus, the context specific framing gives us 
control over what our participants have in mind. In our view, this not only reduces noise but also increases the 
external validity of the experiment. See also Brown and Zehnder (2007) for a discussion of this issue. 
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repayments are not enforceable, a borrower's best response is to never repay a loan in a one 
period game. Lenders, anticipating this behavior, will never offer credit in a one-shot 
interaction. As our WE and SE treatments last for a finite number of periods, a simple 
backward induction argument ensures that this equilibrium is played in each period of these 
treatments. 
A broad body of experimental evidence suggests, however, that not all people will simply 
maximize monetary payoffs in our experiment. Social preferences based on reciprocity 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) or distributional concerns (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can 
induce borrowers in our experiment to repay loans even in one-shot interactions. Evidence 
from similar one-period trust games or investment games (Berg et al., 1995) suggests that a 
substantial share of second movers, i.e. borrowers in our context, do exhibit such social 
preferences. 
We examine our treatments under the assumption that some (non-distinguishable) 
borrowers are conditionally reciprocal: they are willing to meet their repayment obligations in 
a one-shot situation, as long as the repayment requested by the lender does not exceed a 
threshold value. We assume that this threshold tt SrR =  can be characterized by the 
maximum (gross) interest rate r  that a social borrower is willing to pay. We assume that the 
remaining borrowers are selfish in the sense that they never repay loans in a one-shot 
situation. In accordance with previous experimental evidence, which is also confirmed in our 
experiment, we assume that the share of social borrowers is positive but not large. Therefore, 
it is not profitable for risk-neutral lenders to lend in a one-shot game. Based on these 
assumptions, we provide an analytical examination of the WE and SE treatments in Appendix 
A. In the following we outline the qualitative predictions per treatment resulting from that 
analysis and use these to establish hypotheses for our main treatment effects. 
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Since borrower types are a priori indistinguishable, the WE and SE treatments can be 
characterized as finitely repeated games of incomplete information. Theory suggests that such 
games have multiple equilibria (Kreps et al., 1982). We distinguish between two types of 
equilibria and, within each type, concentrate on the profit-maximizing equilibria for the 
lender, as he makes loan offers (as in Thomas and Worrall, 1994). In the first type of 
equilibria, reputation equilibria, selfish borrowers imitate the behavior of social borrowers 
during the first periods but separate by defaulting towards the end of the game. In the second 
type of equilibria, screening equilibria, selfish borrowers are screened out by the lender in the 
first period, and from period 2 onwards the lender only lends to (now identified) social 
borrowers. 
In the SE treatment the profit-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the lender has the 
lender extend loans of maximum size 10 in periods 1 to 6 and a smaller loan in period 7. Loan 
offers in periods t={2,…,7} are contingent on the borrower repaying all past loans. Therefore, 
a selfish borrower has an incentive to imitate the social one by repaying in periods 1 through 5 
with certainty. In period 6 the selfish borrower is indifferent between repaying and defaulting, 
as the loan size in period 7 falls, and repays with positive but smaller than one probability. 
This allows the lender to learn about the borrower's type in period 6 and lend profitably in 
period 7. Thus, in the SE treatment the profit-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the 
lender has maximum lending in periods 1 through 6 and full repayment in periods 1 through 
5.  
No screening equilibrium exists in the SE treatment. If such equilibrium would exist, 
selfish borrowers would default with certainty in the first period of the game. After their 
default, the lender would offer maximum loans of 10 to the borrowers who did not default, i.e. 
social borrowers. However, given that the lender offers maximum loans in subsequent 
periods, a selfish borrower has no incentive to default in the first period. 
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In the WE treatment, the potential to keep the lender’s funds and reinvest them in the 
future increases the borrower's incentive to default. Still, reputation equilibria exist in this 
treatment. However, these equilibria must be characterized by "starting small" loan profiles: 
to meet the borrower's incentive constraint, the lender must start with non-maximum loans 
and increase the loan size offered to the borrower, if he or she repays. The intuition for this 
result is simple: if the lender offers the maximum loan of 10 in period 1, a selfish borrower 
could default and reinvest these funds in all future periods without paying interest. The selfish 
borrower only stands to gain from repaying initial loans if future loans are higher. Thus, the 
lender earns most profits by offering an increasing loan profile, with the maximum possible 
starting loan size.  
In contrast to the SE treatment, a screening equilibrium does exist in the WE treatment. If 
the lender offers a large enough loan in the first period, a selfish borrower prefers to default 
straight away. For example, a selfish borrower will never repay a maximum loan of 10, with 
desired repayment of 10 r , while a social borrower will repay such a loan.  
Whether the reputation or a screening equilibrium yields higher profits for the lender in the 
WE treatment depends on the parameters of the game: the gross return on investment (3 in our 
experiment) the share of social borrowers, and the threshold interest rate of social borrowers 
r . In Appendix C, we show that if r =2 the lender earns a higher profit in the reputation 
equilibrium than in a screening equilibrium.13  
Comparing our predictions for the WE and SE treatments, we expect lower levels of credit 
volume in the WE than in the SE treatment. There are two reasons for this. First, reputation 
equilibria in the WE treatment should be characterized by “starting small”, and thus by lower 
initial loan sizes than in the SE treatment. Second, in the WE treatment screening equilibria 
which imply no lending to selfish borrowers in periods 2 through 7 exist, in contrast to the SE 
                                                 
13 The assumption that r =2 implies that social borrowers demand at least half the surplus from a loan contract. 
As we show in section 4, this assumption is supported by observed behavior in our experiment. We find that the 
2 is the most common interest rate demanded in both our treatments. 
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treatment. We also expect the default rate in the WE treatment to be higher in initial periods 
but lower in subsequent periods, than in the SE treatment, if some relationships in the WE 
treatment are characterized by screening.  
Aggregate investment may be either higher or lower in the WE than in the SE treatment. If 
both treatments are characterized by reputation equilibria we expect higher investment in the 
SE than in the WE treatment due to lower lending volumes in the WE treatment. However, a 
screening equilibrium in the WE treatment characterized by the maximum loan of 10 in 
period 1 implies full efficiency due to the ability of selfish borrowers to reinvest the lender’s 
funds.  
 
 
4. Results 
We report our results in two steps: Section 4.1 provides an overview of the aggregate 
treatment effects between the WE and SE treatments. This sets the stage for a detailed 
comparison of loan offers and borrower defaults in sections 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
 
4.1. Aggregate treatment effects 
Table 2 presents mean statistics by treatment for lenders' offers and borrowers' acceptance 
and default behavior, as well as the resulting level of investment and payoffs. Our matching 
process implies that each lender (borrower) played the lending game with three different 
borrowers (lenders). Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics based on the observed 
outcome in all three rounds. Panel B reports results for 3rd round behavior only. In both 
panels the significance of treatment effects between the WE and SE are measured by p-values 
of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests, which use the means per matching group as independent 
observations. 
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Table 2 here 
 
Credit volume, defined as the average loan size per period, is lower in the WE treatment 
compared to the SE treatment. If we consider all three rounds (Panel A) the average credit 
volume per period is 3.17 in the WE treatment, compared to 5.67 in the SE treatment (p=.01). 
A similar result is obtained if we consider only the third round (Panel B).  
 
Result 1: Weak debt enforcement leads to a lower credit volume in the WE treatment 
compared to the SE treatment. 
 
The Interest rate offered by lenders, defined as the desired repayment divided by the loan 
size, is close to 2 in both treatments, which implies that most lenders offered an equal split of 
the surplus. After learning, in round 3, the interest rate is not significantly different between 
the WE and SE treatments (p=.42).  
Turning to borrower behavior, Table 2 shows that the large majority of loan offers are 
accepted. We also find a low Default rate in both the WE and SE treatments. Considering all 
three rounds, the default rate is 36% in the WE treatment and 21% in the SE treatment. If we 
consider the last round, defaults are at 30% and 16%, respectively, and the difference between 
them is not significant (p=.15). 
 
Result 2: Weak debt enforcement does not lead to a significant difference in aggregate 
default rates between the WE treatment and the SE treatment. 
 
We find similar level of Investment in the WE (5.45) and the SE treatment (5.54) 
considering all three rounds. However, by round 3 investment falls substantially in the WE 
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treatment and is significantly lower than in the SE treatment (p=.03). The smaller credit 
volume and similar default rates thus lead to lower efficiency in the WE treatment.  
Lender profits differ significantly between the WE and SE treatments. In the WE 
treatment lenders just break even and earn significantly less than in the SE treatment (10.83 
vs. 13.26, p<.01). Conversely, Borrower profits are higher in the WE than in the SE treatment 
although this difference is not statistically significant (20.06 vs. 17.82, p=.13). 
Having described the aggregate effects of weak enforcement on credit volume, default and 
efficiency in this section we now turn to investigating how these effects come about. In 
sections 4.2 and 4.3 we provide a detailed comparison of lender and borrower behavior over 
the course of their relationships in the WE treatment to the SE treatment.  
 
4.2. Loan offers 
Figure 1A displays the distribution of loan offers in the first period of relationships in the 
WE and SE treatments. The figure reveals that large loans are less frequent in the initial 
period in the WE compared to the SE treatment. In the SE treatment more than 35% of 
lenders chose the maximum loan size of 10, and over 65% offer loan sizes strictly larger than 
4. By contrast, in the WE treatment only 19% of lenders offer a loan of 10 in period 1 and less 
than 45% of loans offered are of size 5 and above. In this treatment, small loans are most 
frequent. More than 40% of the lenders offer loans of sizes between 1 and 4. Figure 1B shows 
that the distribution of interest rates is similar in the WE and SE treatments: In both 
treatments the surplus sharing gross interest rate of 2 is most common. 
 
Figure 1 here 
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Table 3 reports the results of OLS regressions relating first-period loan offers to the 
treatment (WE or SE) and characteristics of the lender. Period 1 loans are significantly 
smaller in the WE than SE treatment (see column 3). Table 3 also confirms that there is no 
difference in first-period interest rates between the two treatments (columns 4-6). 
The variation in period 1 loan offers across lenders seems to be strongly related to 
individual risk attitudes. In Table 3 we control for three measures of lender characteristics 
using data from the pre-experimental games discussed in section 2.3. We find that lenders 
with higher indicators of risk aversion offer smaller period 1 loans. This finding confirms 
field evidence by Schaechter (2007) suggesting that first-mover behavior in trust-games is 
significantly related to individual risk attitudes. We find no relation between loan offers in 
period 1 and our measures of strategic reasoning or trust.14 
 
Result 3: In the WE treatment lenders offer smaller loans in the initial period of relationships 
compared to the SE treatment, while interest rates are similar in both treatments. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
This result suggests that lenders start relationships with large loans in the SE treatment, as 
predicted under the reputation equilibrium. Many lenders offer maximal loan sizes of 10, in 
line with the payoff-maximizing equilibrium for risk neutral lenders, while lenders who are 
risk averse choose smaller loan sizes. In contrast, in the WE treatment, we observe a different 
distribution of loan sizes, which suggests that screening is more frequent in this treatment: 
Some lenders choose to offer large loans, consistent with the screening equilibrium (we will 
see below that these suffer from a great probability of default), while more than 40% choose 
                                                 
14 If each lender characteristic is entered separately (instead of jointly as in Table 3), results remain the same.  
This suggests that risk attitudes directly, not through their impact on trust, affect first-period loan sizes. 
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to offer small loan, consistent with “starting small” as predicted for the reputation equilibria in 
this treatment. In what follows, we confirm the prevalence of more screening in the WE 
treatment, as well as the different characteristics of reputation equilibria across treatments, by 
examining the evolution of credit relationships and borrower defaults. 
Table 4 illustrates how relationships develop over time in the WE and SE treatment. We 
classify each lender-borrower relationship into one of three types at the end of each period: 
relationships in which no loan has been extended (No loan), relationships in which a loan has 
been extended in at least one period and no default has occurred (No default), and 
relationships in which at least one loan has been extended and the borrower has defaulted at 
least once (Default). In the WE treatment more relationships are characterized by default in 
earlier stages of the relationship than the SE treatment. By period 3 only 38% of relationships 
are without default in the WE treatment, while 68% are in the SE treatment (p=.01). After 
period 5 more relationships feature defaults in the SE treatment. These patterns support our 
prediction that relationships are more likely to involve screening in the WE treatment. 
 By the end of the lending game, in period 7, a similar small proportion of relationships 
experience no default, 21% in the WE treatment and 24% in the SE treatment. This supports 
the evidence provided in Appendix B that a similar  share of “social” borrowers exists in each 
treatment. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Lenders react strongly to defaults in our experiment. Figure 2 and Table 5 examine the 
decision of lenders to renew loan offers to borrowers over the course of relationships. Lenders 
are significantly more likely to offer a new loan if there was no default by the borrower in 
previous periods, in both treatments. On average the probability of a loan offer is 0.5 higher if 
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the borrower repaid previous loans, as can be seen from the coefficient of No past default in 
column 5 of Table 5. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Interestingly, in the WE treatment, lenders are less likely to renew loan contracts than in 
the SE treatment. The probability of renewal increases on average by 0.41 (column 1) in 
treatment WE and 0.65 (column 2) in treatment SE, if the borrower did not default in the past 
compared to the case he did. Thus, we obtain a significant negative coefficient of WE * No 
default, in column 5 of Table 5. This difference in conditionality across treatments is not 
predominantly driven by the reaction of lenders to defaulting or non-defaulting borrowers. If a 
borrower does not default, contract renewal is slightly less likely in the WE treatment (column 
3), while if he defaults, contract renewal is slightly more likely in this treatment (column 4).  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Figure 3 and Table 6 examine the time structure of the loan size in relationships 
without previous default in more detail. Figure 3A displays the mean loan size over the 
course of a relationship for those relationships with no prior default. In the SE treatment, the 
mean loan size to non-defaulting borrowers increases strongly over time; from 6.3 in period 1 
to 8.8 in period 5. This result does not correspond exactly with the profit-maximizing 
equilibrium for the lender in the SE treatment, a flat profile of loans of size 10, but is in line 
with previous experimental research (Anderhub et al., 2002; Cochard et al., 2004; King-Casas 
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et al., 2005 and Bornhorst et al., 2010).15 By contrast, the loan size remains almost constant 
over time in the WE treatment. Here the mean loan size to non-defaulting borrowers increases 
from 4.4 in period 1 to 5.4 in period 2. After this, however, the mean loan size hovers between 
4.9 and 5.5 until period 6 before falling to 2 in the final period. 
The constant loan sizes over time in the WE treatment are surprising. After all, in this 
treatment the lender can only motivate (selfish) borrowers to repay by increasing loan sizes 
over time. Analyzing loan offers in more detail we find that the flat pattern of mean loan size 
in the WE treatment over time is driven by some lenders who stop lending, although the 
borrower did not default. In Figure 3B we therefore examine the mean loan size in "active" 
relationships only, i.e. relationships in which lenders always offered a strictly positive loan 
between periods 1 and 5. Considering these relationships only, we find a significant increase 
in the mean loan size for both the SE and the WE treatment. In particular in the WE treatment 
the loan size increases from 4.4 in period 1 to 8.4 in period 6.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
Table 6 provides a multivariate analysis of loans and interest in relationships without 
previous default. We relate the loan size and interest offered by lenders to the period of the 
relationship and the round of the experiment. To account for non-linear time trends of loan 
offers we include the period of the relationship as well as its squared value in the model. We 
account for heterogeneity in loan offers across lenders with lender random effects. We 
confirm the pattern of loan sizes presented in Figure 3B. We find a significant positive 
coefficient of Period and a negative coefficient of its squared value for both treatments 
(columns 1-3). These results suggest that, controlling for the (significant) heterogeneity in 
                                                 
15 These studies show that in repeated trust games first-movers do increase the stakes over time, and that this 
can be explained by learning (Anderhub et al, 2002).  
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behavior across lenders, loan sizes in no-default relationships increase over time, but at a 
declining growth rate, in both treatments. These findings confirm the results of McMillan and 
Woodruff (1999) who find a concave increase in credit volume over time in trade credit 
relationships in Vietnam. Interest rates are not significantly affected by defaults in either 
treatment (columns 4-6). 
In unreported regressions we replace the lender random effects with our measures of risk 
aversion, strategic reasoning, and trust from our pre-experimental games. Confirming our 
results from Table 3 we find that in both treatments risk averse lenders offer lower loans to 
borrowers, even when they have never defaulted in the past. We also find that the lenders’ 
level of trust is strongly correlated with loan offers to non-defaulting borrowers in the WE 
treatment, but not in the SE treatment. Lenders’ level of strategic reasoning is not correlated 
with loan offers to non-defaulting borrowers in either treatment. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Result 4: In the WE and SE treatments, lenders increase loan sizes to borrowers who repaid 
all prior loans, but do not alter interest rates.  
 
4.3. Loan defaults 
Figure 4 displays the probability of default by borrowers in the WE and SE treatment. 
Figure 4A displays defaults in period 1 depending on the loan size offered to borrowers. The 
figure shows that in the WE treatment, the probability of default in period 1 is lower for loans 
of sizes 1-4, than for loans of 5-9 and loans of size 10. By contrast, in the SE treatment the 
probability of default is equally low for small and large loans. This finding supports our 
prediction that the possibility to keep and reinvest the lender’s funds gives borrowers stronger 
24 
 
incentives to default on large loans at the beginning of a relationship. Since borrowers who 
default are likely not to receive a future loan offer, large loan sizes in the first period of the 
relationship serve as a screening device, in line with the screening equilibrium in the SE 
treatment.  
Figure 4B displays probability of default by period in the WE and SE treatments. Defaults 
in the SE treatment occur in less than 20% of the cases in the period 1 and periods 2 to 5, 
while they increase substantially in periods 6 and 7. As in Brown and Zehnder (2007) this 
pattern suggests the presence of strong reputation incentives. Selfish borrowers imitate social 
ones during the first periods and start defaulting as the game comes close to an end. By 
contrast, in the WE treatment we find that most defaults are concentrated in periods 2 to 6. 
Comparing the WE to the SE treatment we find a higher probability of default in initial 
periods but a lower probability in the final period of the relationship. This finding supports 
our hypothesis that the WE treatment may be characterized by more screening and less 
reputation building than the SE treatment. 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
Table 7 presents the results of a regression analysis of individual borrower default 
probabilities in the WE and SE treatments. The results in the table are presented separately for 
period 1 (columns 1-4) and periods 2 to 7 (columns 5-8). They reveal that defaults are more 
likely in the WE treatment in period 1, if loan sizes are large. This confirms the relationship 
between loan sizes and default observed in Figure 4A.  
Interestingly, larger loan sizes decrease the probability of default in the SE treatment for 
periods 2 to 7, while higher interest rates increase this probability. The variable Period also 
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confirms the pattern observed in Figure 4B, that there is a stronger time trend on loan default 
in the SE than in the WE treatment.  
In unreported regressions we replace borrower random effects in columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 6 with the measures of risk aversion, strategic reasoning and trustworthiness from our 
pre-experimental games. Interestingly we find that default behavior in the WE and SE 
treatments are unrelated to risk aversion and trustworthiness. We find that default rates are 
positively related to strategic reasoning in the SE but not in the WE treatment. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
Result 5: In the WE treatment the default rate in initial periods is higher than in the SE 
treatment, but the increase in the default rate towards the end of the game is also more 
moderate. This suggests that there is more screening out of selfish borrowers and less 
reputation based relational contracts in the WE compared the SE treatment. 
 
  
5. Conclusion 
In countries with weak creditor protection relational contracting between lenders and 
borrowers may not provide a perfect substitute enforcement mechanism. In this paper we 
examine the impact of weak debt enforcement, which allows borrowers to default and reinvest 
the lender’s, on lender-borrower relationships in an experimental credit market.  
Our results suggest that weak debt enforcement reduces the number of relational contracts 
in which moral hazard is mitigated through reputation incentives. Instead, weak enforcement 
increases the number of relationships in which selfish borrowers are screened out by lenders. 
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When relational contracts do emerge under weak enforcement they are characterized by a 
smaller credit volume as lenders initiate relationships with smaller loans.  
Our findings provide strong support to the conjecture that observed patterns of investment 
in microfinance and FDI relationships may be driven by concerns over borrower default. In 
particular, the small initial investment sizes, observed in such relationships (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2006; Rauch and Watson, 2003) may be driven by the fear that borrowers or host-
country partners may default and continue to use the investor’s funds in the future.   
Our findings also highlight the importance of a common problem in sovereign lending: the 
fact that a creditor country often lacks the legal power to seize any assets from the borrowing 
country, in case the latter defaults on its debt obligations (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). We show 
that in a lending environment where the borrower can continue to invest the lender’s funds 
after default and the lender cannot sanction the borrower, as is the case in sovereign lending, 
borrowers will face credit constraints. 
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Mann‐Whitney 
test (p‐values)
WE SE WE vs. SE
Credit volume 3.17 5.67 0.01
Interest 2.13 1.99 0.05
Acceptance  88% 96% 0.04
Default 36% 21% 0.05
Investment volume 5.45 5.54 0.91
Lender profit 10.83 13.26 0.01
Borrower profit 20.06 17.82 0.13
Mann‐Whitney 
test (p‐values)
WE SE WE vs. SE
Credit volume 2.40 5.87 0.00
Interest 2.09 2.00 0.42
Acceptance 92% 99% 0.09
Default 30% 17% 0.15
Investment volume 4.41 5.78 0.03
Lender profit 11.09 14.14 0.01
Borrower profit 17.73 17.42 0.42
Table 2. Summary Statistics by Treatment
The table reports means for each variable by treatment, at the matching group level. It also reports the Mann‐
Whitney test p‐values comparing outcomes across treatments. Credit volume is the size of the loan offered by 
the lender and has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 10. Interest is the gross interest rate
calculated as desired repayment / loan size for all loan offers exceeding 0. By design Interest lies between 0
and 3. Acceptance is a dummy variable which is 1 if loan size > 0 and the offer was accepted and 0 if loan size
> 0 and the offer was declined. Default is a dummy variable which is 1 if a loan was accepted and the desired
repayment was not made, and 0 if a loan was accepted and the desired repayment was made. Investment 
volume is defined as the accepted loan size plus the capital of the borrower. Lender profit and Borrower 
profit  are the per‐period payoffs of the lender / borrower. 
Mean
Panel A. All rounds
Mean
Panel B. Round 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment WE SE WE and SE WE SE WE and SE
WE Treatment ‐2.185*** 0.147
[0.540] [0.105]
Risk aversion ‐0.440* ‐0.632** ‐0.575*** ‐0.021 0.030* 0.015
[0.187] [0.208] [0.110] [0.034] [0.013] [0.021]
Strategic Reasoning ‐0.015 ‐0.039 ‐0.026 ‐0.003 0.003 ‐0.001
[0.057] [0.038] [0.042] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003]
Trust 0.330 0.057 0.154 ‐0.029 0.028* 0.013
[0.285] [0.140] [0.127] [0.025] [0.012] [0.013]
Constant 7.165 12.082*** 11.005*** 2.630*** 1.422*** 1.891***
[6.001] [2.852] [3.381] [0.384] [0.300] [0.297]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender effects no no no no no no
Round fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 63 72 135 54 71 125
Number of Lenders 21 24 45 21 24 45
R2 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.07
Table 3. Determinants of first‐period loan offers
The table reports OLS estimates for the dependent variables Loan size (columns 1‐3) and Interest (columns 4‐6),
using observations from the first period of each relationship only. WE Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for
all observations from the WE treatment and zero for those from the SE treatment. The variables Risk aversion , 
Strategic reasoning and Trust are lender‐specific measures elicited from pre‐experiment games. All regressions
include Round fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are corrected for clustering at the matching
group level. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Loan size Interest
Period No Default Default No loan No Default Default No loan
1 65% 21% 14% 82% 17% 1%
2 56% 38% 6% 72% 26% 1%
3 38% 57% 5% 68% 31% 1%
4 35% 60% 5% 63% 36% 1%
5 25% 70% 5% 58% 40% 1%
6 21% 75% 5% 39% 61% 0%
7 21% 75% 5% 24% 76% 0%
SE TreatmentWE treatment
This table classifies each relationship into one of three types at the end of each period:
Relationships in which a loan has been extended in at least one period and no default has
occurred (No default ), relationships in which at least one loan has been extended and the
borrower has defaulted at least once (Default ), and relationships in which no loan has been
extended in any period so far (No loan ).
Table 4: Lender ‐borrower relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Treatment WE SE Pooled Pooled Pooled
Previous default? Pooled Pooled No  Yes Pooled
Period 0.088 0.175** 0.011 0.222 0.186***
[0.104] [0.087] [0.013] [0.153] [0.057]
Period2 ‐0.020 ‐0.027*** ‐0.002 ‐0.031* ‐0.027***
[0.014] [0.010] [0.002] [0.016] [0.006]
No past default 0.407*** 0.655*** 0.527***
[0.153] [0.073] [0.037]
WE Treatment ‐0.009 0.220 0.230
[0.012] [0.193] [0.195]
WE * Period ‐0.064
[0.088]
WE * Period2 0.007
[0.010]
WE * No past default ‐0.185***
[0.057]
Constant 0.262**
[0.128]
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS
Lender random effects yes yes yes yes yes
Round fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 306 432 426 312 738
Number of Lenders 21 24 44 43 45
R2  ‐ overall 0.356
Contract renewal
The table reports marginal effects (columns 1‐4) and OLS estimates (column 5) for contract renewal to
borrowers in periods 2 through 7. Period and Period 2 are variables denoting the period of the relationship
and its squared value, respectively. WE Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations from
the WE treatment and zero for those from the SE treatment. No past default is a dummy for those borrowers
which received at least one loan and never defaulted in prior periods. All regressions include random effects
per lender and Round fixed effects, which are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Table 5. Conditional contract renewal in periods 2‐7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
Treatment WE SE WE and SE WE SE WE and SE
Period 2.382*** 3.133*** 3.140*** 0.092 0.038 0.042
[0.684] [0.520] [0.512] [0.108] [0.023] [0.044]
Period2 ‐0.295*** ‐0.413*** ‐0.414*** ‐0.012 ‐0.005* ‐0.005
[0.079] [0.059] [0.058] [0.013] [0.003] [0.005]
WE Treatment ‐1.454 0.094
[1.770] [0.169]
WE * Period ‐0.788 0.064
[0.875] [0.081]
WE * Period2 0.122 ‐0.009
[0.100] [0.010]
Constant 1.957 3.240*** 3.338*** 2.098*** 1.935*** 1.951***
[1.428] [1.097] [1.081] [0.213] [0.059] [0.100]
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lender random effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Round fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 151 275 426 127 250 377
Number of Lenders 20 24 44 20 24 44
Overall R2  0.126 0.133 0.229 0.003 0.000 0.064
This table reports panel estimates for Loan size (columns 1‐3) and Interest rates (columns 4‐6) using random effects
per lender in relationships without any previous default. Period and Period 2 are variables denoting the period of the
relationship and its squared value, respectively. WE treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations
from the WE treatment and zero for those from the SE treatment. All regressions include random effects per lender
and Round fixed effects, which are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Table 6. Loan size and interest rates in relationships without default
Loan size  Interest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment WE SE WE and SE WE SE WE and SE
Loan size 0.042* 0.013 0.014 ‐0.002 ‐0.020* ‐0.026***
[0.023] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.009]
Interest ‐0.033 0.037 0.039 0.379*** 0.468*** 0.432***
[0.193] [0.194] [0.194] [0.119] [0.133] [0.082]
Period 0.047 ‐0.310*** ‐0.351***
[0.168] [0.103] [0.080]
Period2 0.002 0.047*** 0.053***
[0.020] [0.013] [0.009]
WE Treatment 0.091 ‐0.248
[0.563] [0.350]
WE * Loan size 0.027 0.014
[0.027] [0.013]
WE * Interest ‐0.049 ‐0.145
[0.266] [0.107]
WE * Period 0.368***
[0.134]
WE * Period2 ‐0.052***
[0.015]
Constant 0.051 0.024
[0.422] [0.241]
Method Probit Probit OLS Probit Probit OLS
Borrower random effects no no no yes yes yes
Round fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 43 65 108 173 300 473
Number of Borrowers 21 24 45
R2 (overall if periods 2‐7) 0.076 0.239
Periods 2 to 7Period 1
The table reports marginal effects (columns 1‐2 and 4‐5), OLS estimates (columns 3 and 6) for the
dependent variable Default which is 1 if the borrower did not make the desired repayment after accepting
a loan offer and 0 if the borrower made the desired repayment. Loan size and Interest are size of the loan
and the gross interest rate (desired repayment / loan size) offered by the lender in the accepted loan
contract. Period and Period 2 are variables denoting the period of the relationship and its squared value,
respectively.WE Treatment is a dummy variable which is 1 for all observations from the WE treatment and
zero for those from the SE treatment. All regressions include Round fixed effects. Regressions in columns 4
to 6 include borrower random effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Table 7. Determinants of defaults
This figure displays the distribution of Loan size  and Interest  in period 1 loan offers by treatment.
Figure 1. Period 1 loan offers in the WE and SE Treatments
Figure 1B. Interest
Figure 1A. Loan size
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Figure 2. Contract renewal by treatment
Figure 2 displays the probability that lenders renew loan contracts, i.e. offer a positive loan size, for periods 2 to
7. This probability is displayed for two cases: if the borrower defaulted in previous periods (past default) and if
the borrower did not default in previous periods (No past default) for each treatment separately
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Figure 3B. Loan size in "active" relationships without default
Figure 3. Relationships without default
Figure 3A. Loan size in relationships without default
Figure 3A displays the mean Loan size offered by treatment and period in no default relationships
(classified as in Figure 2). For period 1 we report the mean loan size and interest rate across all
offers. Figure 3B considers only those no default relationships which are "active", i.e. those
relationships  in which the lender always offered a strictly positive loan size. 
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Figure 4. Loan defaults
Figure 4A displays the average default over groups of loan sizes in period 1, by treatment. Figure 4B displays
the average default probability of loans over time, by treatment. In Figure 4B the number of loans in each
group is displayed at the top of the graph. The average default probability is calculated at the matching
group level. 
Figure 4A. Default probability by loan size in period 1
Figure 4B. Default probability by period
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Appendix A. Behavior in Pre-experiment Games  
Table A1 summarizes the behavior of our subjects in the three pre-experiment games described in 
section 2.3. The table shows that there is no significant difference in pre-experiment game behavior 
between the WE and SE treatments.  
Table A1. Behavior in pre-experiment games in the WE and SE treatments. 
Treatment WE SE T-test WE vs. SE
  Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max Pr(|T| > |t|) 
Risk aversion 42 5.9 2.0 0 11 48 6.1 1.5 3 10 0.54
Strategic Reasoning 42 71.7 16.1 20 97 48 71.8 12.1 40 94 0.98
Trust 42 5.8 3.2 0 10 48 5.1 3.6 0 10 0.32
Trustworthiness 42 19.5 13.6 0 46 48 18.6 13.1 0 44 0.76
 
The first game was a risk preference elicitation task (following Dohmen et al, forthcoming). In this 
task, each player made eleven decisions, each of which had two options, A and B. Option A was a 
lottery with two outcomes, 0 and 100 points. The probability that the second outcome would be drawn 
was one half in each decision. Option B was a certain amount, which ranged from 0 points (in decision 
number 1) to 100 points (in decision number 11) and incremented by 10 points as the decision number 
increased. The indicator Risk aversion in Table A1 reports the number of times a subject chose option 
B in this game. 
The second game was a one-shot guessing game (Nagel 1995). Each participant was randomly 
matched with 5 other participants. Each participant had to choose a number between 0 and 100. The 
participant whose choice was closest to 2/3 of the average choice would be the winner of a prize of 
150 points. The indicator Strategic Reasoning in Table A1 is the choice made by subjects in this 
guessing game. 
The third game was a one-shot lending game, played in the strategy method. First, subjects were 
asked to make decisions in the role of borrower. They were shown a table in which each column 
displayed a loan size in steps of 2 (2, 4, 6, 8 and 10), while each row displayed a requested repayment 
in steps of 2 (2, 4, ..., 30). They were asked whether they would make the desired repayment, in each 
cell of the table for which the desired repayment was smaller or equal to three times the loan size. The 
subject then moved onto a different screen in which he was asked to make his decisions as a lender, 
i.e. to make a loan offer and request a repayment, both in steps of 2. The indicator Trust in Table A1 is 
the loan offer a subject chose to make as a lender in this game. The indicator Trustworthiness in Table 
B is the number of times a subject chose to repay as a borrower in this game. 
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Appendix B. Predictions for the WE and SE treatments
1
B.1. The Repeated Lending Game
A lender and a borrower interact for T = 7 periods. In every period, the schedule of events
is the following:
1. The lender has an endowment of 10 in every period t: The borrower has a capital of
Ct; where C1 = 0:
2. The lender makes an o¤er (St; Rt) to the borrower. Whereby St 2 [0; 10   Ct] and
Rt 2 [1; v]St; where v > 1.
3. The borrower chooses to accept (At = 1) or reject (At = 0) the o¤er.
4. If the o¤er is accepted, the borrower earns an investment income of I1 = v  (St + Ct)
and chooses whether to repay (Dt = 0) or default (Dt = 1)
We examine behavior in this game under two di¤erent conditions. First, in what we call
the lending game with strong debt enforcement (or strong enforcement case), the capital of
the borrower is Ct = 0 in all periods. Second, in the lending game with weak enforcement,
where we have that the borrowers capital for t > 1 is:
Ct =
Pt 1
k=1 SkDk
The monetary payo¤ for the lender t is 10 if he decides not to give a loan or if his loan
o¤er is not accepted. If he gives out a loan, his o¤er species a loan size St and a repayment
of Rt = itSt; where it 2 [1; v]: If the borrower accepts the o¤er (At = 1), he receives St and
chooses whether to repay or not. Thus the lenders payo¤ t in period t is:
t = 10 AtSt(1  it(1 Dt))
In turn, the borrowers income stems from two sources. He has a xed income from
other self-nanced projects or income from other activities of 10. Additionally, he earns
an investment income, which depends on whether he accepts a loan o¤er and the loan
size o¤ered St; as well as his own capital. If the borrower decides to repay, Rt = itSt is
transferred to the lender. If he defaults, he accumulates capital for the next period, Ct+1;
if in the lending game with weak enforcement: The borrowers payo¤ Ut in period t is:
Ut = 10 + v  (AtSt + Ct) AtRt(1 Dt)  Ct+1
There are two borrower types, conditionally reciprocal (H for high) and selsh (L for
low), not observable to the lender. An L type repays a loan if it maximizes his monetary
payo¤s. An L type borrower will thus never repay a loan in period T: Assuming that lenders
o¤er contracts (St; it) only to a borrower who repays in all prior periods, the incentive
constraint of an L type borrower in the game with strong enforcement for periods t =
f1; :::; T   1g is:
[ICL, SE]
PT 1
k=t (v   ik)Sk + vST  vSt
In the game with weak enforcement the incentive constraint for the L type borrower is
[ICL, WE]
PT 1
k=t (v   ik)Sk + vST 
PT 1
k=t (v   1)St + vSt
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Note that in both incentive constraints, the monetary payo¤ of the borrower is positive.
His participation constraint is therefore satised and has an incentive to accept any loan
o¤er.
The H type borrower repays any loan he has accepted. However, the H type also cares
about relative payo¤s, which makes him yield negative utility if the gross interest rate is
above a threshold r 2 (1; v):The participation constraint of the H type can thus be written
as
[PCH] it  r
The lenders prior about the borrower being of type H is p 2 (0; 1), i.e. p is the ex-ante
probability that the borrower is of type H. For any period t > 1 the lender updates his belief
pt on the borrowers type using BayesRule. If selsh borrowers repay in period t 1 with a
probability t 1 2 [0; 1]; then the lenders updated belief is given by pt = pt 1pt 1+t 1(1 pt 1) :
Assuming that the participation constraint of H borrowers is met in all periods (it  r)
and that L type borrowers repay with a repayment probability 1; ::::7 , whereby 7 = 0 ,
the participation constraint of the lender can be dened as
[PC Lendert]
PT
k=t Sk ((pk + k(1  pk)) ik   1)  0; whereby ik  r
Since 7 = 0; for lenders to lend in the nal period we must have pT r   1  0:
In what follows we will describe the equilibria of the repeated lending game, both with
weak and strong enforcement. The equilibrium concept used throughout is that of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We will consider two types of equilibria: reputation and
screening equilibria. Reputation equilibria are dened as those equilibria in which the L
borrower repays loans at least in period 1. He thus builds a reputation, by imitating the
H borrower for at least one period. Screening equilibria are dened as those in which the
L type borrower defaults with certainty in period 1. Therefore, for the rest of the game L
borrowers have been screened out and H types are identied. Whenever these equilibria
exist, there exist a plethora of them. As is conventional in the literature (e.g. Thomas and
Worral, 1994), we concentrate on the equilibrium which is prot-maximizing for the lender,
as he is the player making o¤ers and the borrower only has the option of accepting them or
not.
We make the following assumptions regarding the ex-ante probability p that the borrower
is of type H. Assumption 1 implies that the proportion of H type borrowers does not make
it protable to extend a loan in a one-shot situation:
Assumption 1: p < 1r
Assumption 2 implies that the proportion of H type borrowers is high enough to make
a reputation equilibrium feasible in the repeated game with T periods feasible:
Assumption 2: p  1
rT
B.2. Lending under strong enforcement
Given our assumptions about p, the prot-maximizing reputation equilibrium for the lender
has maximum loan sizes in all non-nal periods, and a smaller loan in the nal period.
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Borrowers pool in periods 1 through 5, during which L borrowers always repay. In period 6
L borrowers default with positive probability and in period 7 they default always.
Proposition 1: In the lending game with strong enforcement the prot-maximizing
reputation equilibrium for the lender is characterized by o¤ers (St; it) = (10; r) if t  6 and
(S7; i7) =
 
10 rv ; I

. The H type borrower accepts and repays in all periods. The L type
borrower accepts in all periods, repays with t = 1 in periods t  5; with 6 = p(1 p) (r   1)
and 7 = 0.
Proof: We rst consider whether the IC of the L type borrower is satised in periods 1
to 6. Then, we check whether the PC of the H type borrower is satised. Finally, whether
the lenders PC is satised and whether the equilibrium is prot-maximizing.
 L type borrower repayment: Condition [ICL, SE] holds with inequality in all periods
t < 6: In period 6 it holds with equality, so we know that the L type borrower is
indi¤erent between repaying and not. Thus, 1 = ::: = 5 = 1 and 6 =
p
(1 p)(r   1)
is a best response behavior.
 H type borrower accepts and repays as it = r for all t:
 Lender contracts: Condition [PC LenderT ] is met with equality if he o¤ers (S7; i7) = 
10 rv ; r

; as pT =
p
p+6(1 p) =
1
r : The lenders prots from lending in period 6 are
ST 1 ((p+ 6(1  p)) iT 1   1) which are positive for (S6; i6) = (10; r) ; as p > 1r2
(Assumption 2). Since t = 1 in all periods t  5 the lenders participation constraint
is met.
 This equilibrium is prot-maximizing for the lender for three reasons: (i) it = r;
therefore the H type borrower repays, and the lender extracts the maximum surplus;
(ii) since @t@St > 0; conditional on repayment, o¤ering maximum loan sizes (of 10) until
period 6 is prot-maximizing; (iii) Since t = 1 until period 5, he obtains maximum
prots until this period and screening starts in the last period possible, 6.
In the game with strong enforcement, a separating equilibrium, in which L borrowers
default with certainty in period 1, does not exist. In such an equilibrium the lender will
o¤er maximum credit at the interest rate r for all periods 2 through 7 to borrowers who
repay in period 1. Given this prospective loan schedule L borrowers would not default in
period 1.
Proposition 2: In the lending game with strong enforcement no fully separating equi-
librium (1 = 0) exists.
Proof: In a fully separating equilibrium the lender will set the maximum possible
interest rate and loan size (St; it) = (10; r) in all periods t > 1. The incentive constraint
of L borrowers is then
P6
t=2 (v   r) 10 + v10  i1S1. Given that the interest rate in period
1 cannot exceed r it is impossible for the lender to o¤er a contract which does not meet
[ICL, SE].
Finally, note that the equilibrium described in Proposition A1 is second-best, as the
loan sizes are maximal until period 6, but must fall in period 7 to meet the L borrowers IC.
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B.3. Lending under weak enforcement
Given the above parameters a reputation equilibrium exists in the lending game with
weak enforcement. In contrast to the strong enforcement treatment, loans are of a smaller
size in period 1 and increase over time, with maximum credit only in the nal period.
Repayment behavior is identical to the reputation equilibrium under strong enforcement:
borrowers pool in periods 1 through 5, with L borrowers repaying always. In period 6 L
borrowers default partly and in period 7 they default always.
Proposition 3: In the game with weak enforcement the prot-maximizing reputation
equilibrium for the lender is characterized by o¤ers (S7; i7) = (10; r) and for all periods t<7:
it = r; St =
(v I)
((7 t)(v 1)+r)
P6
k=t+1 Sk +
v
((7 t)(v 1)+r)10: The H type borrower accepts and
repays in all periods. The L type borrower accepts in all periods, repays with certainty in
periods 1-5, with probability 6 =
p
(1 p)(v   1) and 7 = 0.
Proof:
 L type borrower repayment: The incentive constraint [ICL; WE] holds with equality in
all periods t  6: As a result 6 = p(1 p)(r   1) and t = 1 if t < 6 is a best response
behavior.
 H type borrower accepts and repays as it = r for all t:
 Lender contracts: Proposition A1 shows that the participation constraint of the lender
is met in all periods. The same holds under weak enforcement, as the repayment
behavior of the L type borrowers is identical.
 By the same reasons as in Proposition A1, the interest rate and the repayment behavior
are prot-maximizing for the lender. To incetivize the L type borrower to repay until
period 6 loan sizes have to be increasing, as follows from [ICL; WE]: Therefore, to reach
maximum prots the lender starts by choosing the maximum loan size of 10 in the last
period, 7. In the previous periods, the loan size is chosen such that the borrowers IC
is satised with equality.
Under weak enforcement a separating equilibrium exists in which L borrowers default
with certainty in period 1.
Proposition 4: In the lending game with weak enforcement a fully separating equilib-
rium (1 = 0) exists. The prot-maximizing screening equilibrium for the lender has o¤ers
(S1; i1) =

10 6v 56(v 1)+I ; r

; (S2; i2):::(S7; i7) = (10; r).
Proof: In a screening equilibrium, which maximizes the lenders prots, the lender will
set the maximum interest rate (it = r) and loan size (St = 10) in each period t > 1: In
period 1 the lender o¤ers the maximum interest rate and lowest loan size such that the
borrower does not prefer to default in period 2. This implies that 6(v   1)S1 + vS1 >
(v   i1)S1 + 5(v   1)10 + v10: This implies that i1 = r and S1 = 10 6v 56(v 1)+r :
Note that the screening equilibrium is more e¢ cient than the reputation equilibrium.
This is due to the fact that loan sizes are larger in period 1 under the screening equilibrium
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and L type borrowers default and reinvest these large loans until period 7. Therefore,
investment levels are higher than under the reputation equilibrium. However, full e¢ ciency
is not reached, because this would require an initial loan size of 10, which is not prot-
maximizing for the lender, who can screen by giving out a loan of S1 = 10 6v 56(v 1)+r < 10:
Whether the lender earns a higher prot under the reputation equilibrium or the sepa-
rating equilibrium depends on the schedule of loan sizes in the reputation equilibrium, as
well as the share of H type borrowers. In the next subsection, we use the parameters in
place in our experiment, to generate the predicted loan sizes and compare prots.
B.4. Application to the experiment
In our experiment we have that v = 3: We assume that H type borrowers are conditionally
reciprocal and will repay only if the receive at least half of the gains from trade in any period,
i.e. r = 2: This gross interest rate also coincides with that observed in the experiment.
Assuming r = 2; our assumptions 1 and 2 on the share of H borrowers hold if 12 > p >
 
1
2
7
.
This implies from assumption 2 that a reputation equilibrium would be possible even in
a 2 period repeated game. These parameters also imply the following schedule of loan sizes.
Period Strong Enforcement Weak Enforcement
1 10 4.19
2 10 4.51
3 10 4.92
4 10 5.47
5 10 6.25
6 10 7.5
7 6.666667 10
Table B.1: Predicted loan sizes over time
The prots from the reputation equilibrium are (4:19 + 4:51 + 4:92 + 5:47 + 6:25)(r  
1) + 7:5(p + (1  p) 6)r   7:5 = 25:34 + 7:5
 
pr2   1 = 25:34 + 7:5  4p   7:5 = 17:84 +
30p. In contrast, the prots from the screening equilibrium are 9:29 (rp  1) + 60p(r  
1) = 9:29 (2p  1) + 60p = 78:58p   9:29: The lender earns higher prots in the screening
equilibrium if 78:58p  9:29: > 17:84 + 30p. This is not the case for any p < 27:13=48:58 =
0:56: If p < 1=r = 1=2; as in assumption 1, the lender is better o¤ under the reputation
equilibrium.
6
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Appendix C: Instructions 
 
The instructions displayed below are for all treatments. Parts of the text which are specific to a 
treatment are presented in brackets and the corresponding treatment is mentioned. We use the 
following code for treatments: WE: Weak Enfrocement Treatment and SE: Strong Enfrocement 
Treatment. 
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Instructions for Lenders 
 
For simplicity, throughout these instructions we refer to the lender in the masculine form, i.e 
“he”, and the borrower in the feminine form, i.e. “she”. 
 
Overview of the experiment 
a) For this experiment you have been grouped together with 5 other participants. In this group 
there are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. You will be a lender for the entire duration of the 
experiment.  
b) The experiment consists of 3 rounds: in each round you will be matched with a different 
borrower. You will not be matched with the same borrower twice. You will not be informed 
about the identity of the other participants at any point. 
c) Each round consists of 7 periods. You will interact with the same borrower for 7 periods 
only.  
d) In each period you have an endowment which you can use to offer credit to the borrower. If 
you offer credit you can ask for a repayment from the borrower. If you make a credit offer, 
the borrower decides whether to accept this offer. If the borrower accepts your credit offer, 
she decides whether to make the repayment desired by you. 
e) The points you earn in each period depend on the amount of credit you offer in each period, 
your desired repayment, whether the borrower accepts the offer, and whether the borrower 
makes your desired repayment. 
f) All points that you earn during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into euro at 
the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
25 points = 1 euro 
 
g) This is the final experiment. Your earnings from this experiment will be paid out together 
with your earnings from the previous 3 experiments after this experiment is completed. 
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Experimental Procedures 
There are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers in this experiment. You are a lender for the entire duration of 
the experiment. The experiment lasts for 3 rounds, and in each round you will be matched with a 
different borrower. Each round consists of 7 periods, so that you interact with the same borrower 
for 7 periods. In the following we describe in detail how you and the borrower make decisions in 
each period. Attached to these instructions are screen shots of each screen on which either you or 
the borrower will be required to enter a decision. 
 
1. Investment 
 
In each period of this experiment the borrower has an investment opportunity. The amount the 
borrower invests is determined [WE: by her capital and] by the credit amount the borrower 
receives from you. The borrower’s investment amount cannot exceed 10 points in any period. 
 
[WE:  
In period 1 the borrower’s capital is 0. Her capital in periods 2-7 depends on her and your 
decisions in periods 1-6. How the borrower’s capital in period 2-7 is determined is explained in 
detail in section 4.  
] 
 
Section 2 describes in detail how the borrower’s credit amount in each period is determined. 
 
In each period the investment income of the borrower is three times her investment amount. 
 
Investment amount = [WE: Capital +] Credit amount ≤ 10 
 
Investment income = 3 x Investment amount 
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2. Credit offers  
 
In each period you have an endowment of 10 points. With this endowment you can make a credit 
offer to the borrower. For this purpose, the “credit offer” screen (screen shot attached to these 
instructions) will be shown to you at beginning of each period. 
 
At the top of the screen you can see which round of the experiment you are in, what your 
identification number is, and the identification number of the borrower you are matched with for 
this round. All lenders and borrowers keep their identification number for the whole duration of 
the experiment. This allows you to check that within each round of 7 periods you are always 
matched with the same borrower, and that in each new round you are matched with a new 
borrower. At the top of the screen you also see which period you are in, and the remaining time 
left to make your credit offer (in seconds). In each period you have 30 seconds to make your 
credit offer.  
 
To make a credit offer you first choose the credit amount. As the borrower has a maximum 
investment amount of 10 [WE: which also includes her capital], the maximum credit amount you 
can offer in any period is 10 [WE:  – the borrower’s capital].  
 
You then choose your desired repayment. The desired repayment may not exceed three times 
the credit amount.  
 
0 ≤ Credit amount ≤ 10 [WE: – Capital ]   
 
0 ≤  Desired repayment ≤ 3 x Credit amount   
 
You do not have to make a credit offer to the borrower in any period. If you do not want to make 
a credit offer you can enter a credit amount of 0 and a desired repayment of 0. 
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[WE:  
If the borrower’s capital equals the maximum investment amount of 10, then you cannot make a 
credit offer in this period. In this case the credit offer screen will inform you that no credit offer 
can be made.] 
 
After you have determined your credit offer by entering a credit amount and desired repayment 
you must click on the "enter" button to finalize this offer. As long as you have not clicked on 
"enter" you may revise your offer. 
 
On the left hand side of the “Credit offer” screen you can see the history of your interaction for 
all completed periods in this round. The history displays the following items for each period: 
[WE: the borrower’s capital,] your credit amount offered, your desired repayment and whether 
the desired repayment was made (yes/no). 
 
3. Accepting the credit offer and making the desired repayment.  
 
If you make a credit offer, the borrower will see the details of this offer on the “Credit 
acceptance” screen (screen shot attached). The borrower can then decide whether to accept the 
credit offer or not. 
 
If the borrower accepts a credit offer she then chooses her Actual repayment. The borrower’s 
actual repayment can either be your desired repayment or 0. The borrower decides whether to 
make the desired repayment by choosing “yes” or “no” on the “Repayment decision” screen 
(screen shot attached).  
 
Actual repayment =   Desired repayment or 0 
   
[WE:  
4. The borrower’s capital 
 
In period 1 the borrower’s capital is 0.  
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The borrower’s capital for periods 2, 3, 4, 5 ,6 , or 7 depends on her credit amount and her actual 
repayment in the previous periods.  
• If the borrower did not accept a credit offer in the previous period, her capital is equal to 
that in the previous period.   
• If the borrower accepted a credit in the previous period  and made the desired repayment 
to the lender, her capital is equal to that in the previous period.   
• If the borrower accepted a credit in the previous period and did not make the desired 
repayment to the lender, her capital is equal to that in the previous period plus the credit 
amount in the previous period.   
 
 = Capital in previous period 
 
if no credit offer is accepted in the 
previous period. 
Capital for periods 
 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 = Capital in previous period 
if a credit offer is accepted and the 
desired repayment is made in the 
previous period  
 = Capital in previous period 
+ Credit Amount in previous 
period 
if a credit offer is accepted and the 
desired repayment is not made in the 
previous period 
] 
 
5. Income calculation 
 
If you did not make a credit offer or your offer was not accepted by the borrower your income 
equals your endowment of 10 points in this period. If you did make a credit offer and it was 
accepted by the borrower your income depends on the amount of credit you offered and the 
actual repayment of your borrower. 
 
Your Income = 10 – Credit amount + Actual repayment 
 
In each period the borrower has a certain income of 10 points. As mentioned in section 1 the 
borrower earns an additional investment income which is three-times the size of her investment 
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amount. The borrower’s income in each period equals her 10 points plus her investment income 
minus her actual repayment [WE: and minus the borrower’s capital for the next period. As period 
7 is the final period the borrower’s income in this period equals her 10 points plus her investment 
income minus her actual repayment.] 
 
Income of the Borrower =  
10 + Investment income – Actual repayment [WE: – Capital for next period ] 
 
You will be informed about your income [WE:,][SE: and] the income of the borrower [WE: and 
the borrower’s capital] on the “Income” screen (screen shot attached). 
 
After you have studied the income screen, you can record this information on your 
documentation sheet. You can then proceed to the next period or next round.  
 
Exercises 
The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises that 
will be displayed on your computer screen. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. If you 
have any questions, please contact us. 
 
Exercise 1: 
[WE: In period 1,] what is the maximum credit amount you can offer?  
Maximum credit amount [WE: in period 1 = ] 
 
Exercise 2: 
In period 1 you do not make a credit offer. How high is your income and that of the borrower in 
period 1 [WE: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[WE: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
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Exercise 3: 
In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower does not accept the offer. How high is your income and that of the borrower in period 1 
[WE: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[WE: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
 
Exercise 4: 
In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower accepts the offer and makes the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income and 
that of the borrower in period 1 [WE: and the borrower’s capital for period 2]?  
Your income in period 1 =  
[WE: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
Exercise 5: 
In period 1 you make a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 10. The 
borrower accepts the offer and does not make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your 
income and that of the borrower in period 1 [WE: and the borrower’s capital for period 2? ] 
Your income in period 1 =  
[WE: Borrower’s capital for period 2=] 
Income of the borrower in period 1= 
 
[WE: Exercise 6:  
In period 2 the borrower has a capital of 0. What is the maximum credit amount you can offer to 
the borrower? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
 
[WE: Exercise 7:  
In period 2 the borrower has a capital of 8. What is the maximum credit amount you can offer to 
the borrower? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
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Documentation Sheet – Lenders 
 
Round 1: you are matched with Borrower Nr. : 
Period [WE: 
Borrower’s 
capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
 
Round 2: you are matched with Borrower Nr. : 
Period [WE: 
Borrower’s 
capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
 
Round 3: you are matched with Borrower Nr. : 
Period [WE: 
Borrower’
s capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
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Instructions for Borrowers 
 
For simplicity, throughout these instructions we refer to the lender in the masculine form, i.e 
“he”, and the borrower in the feminine form, i.e. “she”. 
 
Overview of the experiment 
a) For this experiment you have been grouped together with 5 other participants. In this group 
there are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers. You will be a borrower for the entire duration of the 
experiment.  
b) The experiment consists of 3 rounds: in each round you will be matched with a different 
lender. You will not be matched with the same lender twice. You will not be informed about 
the identity of the other participants at any point. 
c) Each round consists of 7 periods. You will interact with the same lender for 7 periods 
only.  
d) In each period the lender has an endowment which he can use to offer credit to you. If the 
lender offers credit he can ask for a repayment from you. If the lender offers credit, you 
decide whether to accept this credit offer. If you accept the credit offer, you decide whether to 
make the repayment desired by the lender.  
e) The points you earn in each period depend the amount of credit offered by the lender, his 
desired repayment, whether you accept the lender’s credit offer, and whether you make the 
desired repayment to him. 
f) All points that you earn during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into euro at 
the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
25 points = 1 euro 
 
g) This is the final experiment. Your earnings from this experiment will be paid out together 
with your earnings from the previous 3 experiments after this experiment is completed. 
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Experimental Procedures 
There are 3 lenders and 3 borrowers in this experiment. You are a borrower for the entire 
duration of the experiment. The experiment lasts for 3 rounds, and in each round you will be 
matched with a different lender. Each round consists of 7 periods, so that you interact with the 
same lender for 7 periods. In the following we describe in detail how you and the lender make 
decisions in each period. Attached to these instructions are screen shots of each screen on which 
either you or the lender will be required to enter a decision. 
 
1.Investment 
 
In each period of this experiment you have an investment opportunity. The amount you invest is 
determined [WE: by your capital and] by the credit amount you receive from the lender. Your 
investment amount cannot exceed 10 points in any period. 
 
[WE:  
In period 1 your capital is 0. Your capital in periods 2-7 depends on your and the lender’s 
decisions in periods 1-6. How your capital in period 2-7 is determined is explained below in 
section 4. ] 
 
Section 2 describes in detail how your credit amount in each period is determined. 
 
In each period your investment income is three times your investment amount. 
 
Investment amount = [WE: Capital +] Credit amount ≤ 10 
 
Investment income = 3 x Investment amount 
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2. Credit offers  
 
In each period the lender has an endowment of 10 points. With this endowment the lender can 
make a credit offer to you. For this purpose, the “credit offer” screen (screen shot attached to 
these instructions) will be shown to the lender at beginning of each period. 
 
To make a credit offer the lender first chooses the credit amount. As you have a maximum 
investment amount of 10 [WE: which also includes your capital], the maximum credit amount 
the lender can offer in any period is 10 [WE:  – capital]. 
 
The lender then chooses his desired repayment. The desired repayment may not exceed three 
times the credit amount.  
 
0 ≤ Credit amount ≤ 10[WE:  – Capital ]   
 
0 ≤ Desired repayment ≤ 3 x Credit amount    
 
The lender does not have to make a credit offer to you in any period. If the lender does not want 
to make a credit offer he can enter a credit amount of 0 and a desired repayment of 0. 
 
[WE:  
If your capital equals your maximum investment amount of 10, then the lender cannot make a 
credit offer to you.] 
 
 
3. Accepting credit offers and choosing the actual repayment 
 
If the lender makes a credit offer to you, you will see the details of this offer on the “Credit 
acceptance” screen (screen shot attached).  
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At the top of the screen you can see which round of the experiment you are in, what your 
identification number is, and the identification number of the lender you are matched with for this 
round. All lenders and borrowers keep their identification number for the whole duration of the 
experiment. This allows you to check that within each round of 7 periods you are always matched 
with the same lender, and that in each new round you are matched with a new lender. At the top 
of the screen you also see which period you are in, and the remaining time left to make your 
decision (in seconds). In each period you have 30 seconds to accept a credit offer.  
 
On the right hand side of the screen you see the credit offer made by the lender. You can decide 
to accept a credit offer or not by clicking on the yes or no button on the right hand side of this 
screen. After you have made your decision you must click on the "enter" button to finalize this 
decision. As long as you have not clicked on "enter" you may revise your decision. 
 
If you decide to accept the credit offer you then choose your Actual repayment. Your Actual 
repayment is either equal to the desired repayment of the lender or 0. You decide whether to 
make the desired repayment by choosing “yes” or “no” on the “Repayment decision” screen 
(screen shot attached).  
 
Actual repayment =   Desired repayment or 0 
   
On the left hand side of the “Credit acceptance” screen and “Repayment decision” screen you can 
see the history of your interaction for all completed periods in this round. The history displays 
the following items for each period: [WE: your capital,] the credit amount offered, the desired 
repayment and whether the desired repayment was made (yes/no).  
 
[WE:  
4. Your capital 
 
In period 1 your capital is 0.  
 
Your capital for periods 2, 3 , 4, 5, 6 or 7 depends on your credit amount and your actual 
repayment in the previous periods.  
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• If you did not accept a credit offer in the previous period, your capital is equal to that in 
the previous period.   
• If you accepted a credit in the previous period and made the desired repayment to the 
lender, your capital is equal to that in the previous period.   
• If you accepted a credit in the previous period and did not make the desired repayment to 
the lender, your capital is equal to that in the previous period plus the credit amount in the 
previous period.   
 
 
 = Capital in previous period 
 
if you did not accepted a credit offer in 
the previous period. 
Capital for periods 
 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7  = Capital in previous period 
if you accepted a credit offer and made 
the desired repayment in the previous 
period  
 = Capital in previous period 
+ Credit Amount in previous 
period 
if you accepted a credit offer and did 
not make the desired repayment in the 
previous period 
] 
 
5. Income calculation 
 
If the lender did not make a credit offer or you did not accept the lender’s offer, the lender’s 
income equals his endowment of 10. If the lender did make a credit offer and it was accepted by 
you, the lender’s income depends on the amount of credit offered and your actual repayment. 
 
Income of Lender = 10 – Credit amount + Actual repayment 
 
In each period you earn a certain income of 10 points. As mentioned in section 1 you earn an 
additional investment income which is three-times the size of your investment amount. Your 
income in each period equals your 10 points plus your investment income minus your actual 
repayment [WE: and minus your capital for the next period. As period 7 is the final period your 
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income in this period equals your 10 points plus your investment income minus your actual 
repayment.] 
 
Your Income =  
10 + Investment income – Actual repayment [WE: –Capital for next period ] 
 
You will be informed about your income [WE:, your capital] and the income of the lender on the 
“Income” screen (screen shot attached). 
 
After you have studied the income screen, you can record this information on your 
documentation sheet. You can then proceed to the next period or next round. 
 
Exercises 
The experiment will not commence, until all participants are completely familiar with all 
procedures. In order to secure that this is the case, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises that 
will be displayed on your computer screen. Wrong answers have no consequences for you. If you 
have any questions, please contact us. 
 
Exercise 1: 
[WE:  In period 1, ] what is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to you?  
Maximum credit amount [WE: in period 1 = ] 
 
Exercise 2: 
In period 1 the lender does not make a credit offer. How high is your income and that of the 
lender in period 1[WE:  and your capital for period 2]?  
[WE: Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
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Exercise 3: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You do not accept the offer. How high is your income and that of the lender in period 1 [WE:  
and your capital for period 2]? 
[WE:  Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1=  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
 
Exercise 4: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You accept the offer and make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income and 
that of the lender in  period 1 [WE:  and your capital for period 2]? 
[WE:  Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
Exercise 5: 
In period 1 the lender makes a credit offer with a credit amount of 8 and a desired repayment of 
10. You accept the offer and do not make the desired repayment of 10. How high is your income 
and that of the lender in period 1 [WE: and your capital for period 2]? 
[WE: Your capital for period 2=] 
Your income in period 1 =  
Income of the lender in period 1= 
 
[WE: Exercise 6:  
In period 2 you have a capital of 0. What is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to 
you? 
Maximum credit amount period 2= ] 
 
[WE: Exercise 7:  
In period 2 you have a capital of 8. What is the maximum credit amount the lender can offer to 
you? 
Maximum credit amount period 2=]  
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Documentation Sheet - Borrowers 
 
Round 1: you are matched with Lender Nr.: 
Period [WE: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
 
Round 2: you are matched with Lender Nr.:  
Period [WE: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
 
Round 3: you are matched with Lender Nr.:  
Period [WE: 
Capital] 
Credit Amount Desired Repayment Actual Repayment Your Income 
1 0     
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
 
 
